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This paper shows how expectations-driven contagion of currency crises
can arise even if the currency market has a unique equilibrium when
viewed in isolation. The model of Morris and Shin (1998) is extended
to allow speculators to trade in a second currency market. If speculators
believe that a devaluation of this other currency will make a domestic
devaluation more likely, they will engage in trades that link the two
markets. A sharp devaluation of the other currency will then be
propagated to the domestic market and will increase the likelihood of
ac r i s i st h e r e ,f u l ﬁlling the original expectations. Even though this
contagion is driven solely by expectations, the model places restrictions
on observable variables, and these restrictions are broadly consistent with
existing empirical evidence.
I thank Huberto Ennis, Paula Hernandez-Verme, Max Stinchcombe, and seminar participants at the University
of Pennsylvania, Queen Mary University of London, Texas A&M University, the University of Alberta, and the
4th Annual University of Texas – ITAM Conference for useful comments.1 Introduction
One of the most striking features of the currency crises of the 1990s was their contagious-
ness: a sharp devaluation of one currency was often followed by devaluations of other, sometimes
seemingly unrelated, currencies. The theoretical explanations for such contagion have fallen into
two broad categories. One emphasizes links between the economic fundamentals of the countries
involved. These links can either be real in nature, based on trade between the countries or compe-
tition in trade, or ﬁnancial, in the form of investors or speculators holding substantial positions in
each of the countries. A crisis in one currency market, in this view, can change the economic fun-
damentals in the market for another currency in such a way that a crisis there becomes more likely
or perhaps inevitable.
1 The second category of explanations emphasizes the self-fulﬁlling nature
of currency crises: it is proﬁtable for a speculator to attack a ﬁxed exchange rate regime if and only
if sufﬁciently many other speculators attack to cause a devaluation. In this view, a currency market
can be viewed as a coordination game played by a large number of speculators. Such a game of-
ten has multiple equilibria, one where all speculators attack and a devaluation occurs and another
where no one attacks and no devaluation occurs. Which equilibrium obtains depends entirely on
the expectations of the speculators playing the game. This approach leads naturally to a simple
theory of expectations-based contagion in which a devaluation in one currency market acts as a
signal that coordinates agents’ expectations on the crisis equilibrium in another market.
2 Deter-
mining the underlying cause of the observed spread of currency crises across markets is important
because the proper design of policies and institutions to limit contagion, and even the desirability
of limiting contagion, depends critically on whether it is generated by fundamental links or by
market expectations.
Recent work, beginning with Morris and Shin (1998), casts doubt on the multiple-equilibrium
explanation by showing that the removal of the assumption that economic fundamentals are com-
mon knowledge can generate a unique equilibrium in an otherwise-standard currency crisis model.
This result would seem to rule out expectations-driven contagion, since the economic fundamen-
1 See, for example, Gerlach and Smets (1995), Eichengreen, et al. (1996), Dornbusch et al. (2000), and Pritsker
(2000).
2 See Obstfeld (1996), Krugman (1999), and Masson (1999).
2tals in each currency market must uniquely determine whether or not a crisis occurs there. Further-
more, the empirical evidence, while far from conclusive, seems to indicate that fundamental links
between countries are an important source of contagion and hence also seems to point against
the idea that expectations play a critical role.
3 The goal of the present paper is to demonstrate
that these results, both theoretical and empirical, are completely consistent with contagion be-
i n gd r i v e ns o l e l yb ya g e n t s ’e x p e c t a t i o n s .E v e n when a currency market has a unique equilibrium,
expectations-drivencontagioncanoccuracrossmarkets, andthiscontagionwillappeartobedriven
by ﬁnancial linkages between the markets.
The deﬁnition of contagion I adopt is following: contagion occurs when a devaluation of one
currency increases the equilibrium probability that a second currency will be devalued. The key
observation in this paper is that when speculators expect the occurrence of a crisis to be correlated
across countries, they have an incentive to engage in ﬁnancial market trades that create links be-
tween otherwise-separate currency markets. These links can then cause a crisis to spread across
the markets in a way that fulﬁlls the original expectations. The implications of this observation
are derived below using a modiﬁed version of the model of Morris and Shin (1998). The value of
the domestic currency is pegged in real terms (or, say, to the U.S. dollar), and a large number of
speculators each decide whether or not to attack the currency. For illustration, I will refer to the
domestic currency as the Brazilian real.
4 The market for reales i se x a c t l ya si nM o r r i sa n dS h i n
(1998), and therefore this market, viewed in isolation, has a unique equilibrium. Whether or not
a crisis occurs in this equilibrium depends on the domestic economic fundamentals, including the
willingness of the domestic government to defend the peg and the ability of speculators to attack
it.
Now suppose that, before this market takes place, another market meets where a foreign cur-
r e n c y( w h i c hIw i l lr e f e rt oa st h eruble) is traded, also against the dollar. The market for rubles
has the same structure as the one for reales described above, and the same speculators may choose
to attack or not attack the ruble. However, the speculators may have less information about the
state of economic fundamentals in the ruble market; their expertise, after all, is in speculating on
the real. Each speculator’s ability to attack the real is constrained by the level of wealth that she
3 See, for example, Glick and Rose (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).
4 I should emphasize that this label is for illustration purposes only. No attempt is made here to explain any speciﬁc
historical episode.
3brings to that market, which depends on the outcome of any trade she makes in the ruble market.
Assume the economic fundamentals in the two markets are uncorrelated. Suppose a speculator
nevertheless believes that there will be contagion. i.e., that a devaluation of the real becomes more
likely following a devaluation of the ruble. Under this belief, her marginalutilityofwealthentering
the market for reales is higher if the ruble has been devalued than if it has not, since a devaluation
of the ruble makes a (proﬁtable) attack on the real more likely. The speculator would therefore
like to transfer wealth from states of nature where the ruble is not devalued to states where it is. In
other words, she has a natural incentive to sell the ruble short. This can be true even if the expected
return to speculating on the ruble is negative, because this speculation yields a positive payoff in
states of the world where her marginal utility of wealth is high, and the negative payoff comes in
states where her marginal utility of wealth is low. If all other speculators in the market for reales
share the belief that contagion will occur, they will all face this same incentive and hence will bet
against the ruble. If a devaluation of the ruble does occur, then, the total wealth that speculators
b r i n gt ot h em a r k e tf o rreales will rise. This increase in wealth enables the speculators to take
larger positions against the real, which in turn makes a devaluation of the real more likely to occur
in equilibrium. Hence the original expectations are fulﬁlled, and there is an equilibrium of the
two-market model where contagion of a currency crisis occurs solely because agents believed it
would occur.
When the expected return to speculating on the ruble is negative, the model has another equilib-
rium in which contagion does not occur. If speculators believe that a devaluation of the ruble will
have no effect on the market for reales, they will have no incentive to trade in rubles and no ﬁnan-
cial links between the two markets will arise. The outcome of the market for reales will then be
independent of whether or not a devaluation of the ruble occurs. Hence the model presented here
can have multiple equilibria, but it should be emphasized that this model is fundamentally different
from the multiple-equilibrium-based explanations of contagion offered in the previous literature.
In the standard explanation, the domestic currency market (viewed in isolation) has multiple equi-
libria, and events in the foreign currency market serve only to select one of these equilibria. Such
models do not explain why the event “devaluation of the ruble” should be the signal for agents
to attack the real instead of the event “no devaluation of the ruble.” In other words, these models
can explain any correlation of outcomes across markets, positive or negative. The model presented
4here, in contrast, offers a genuine explanation of the contagion of crises: a sharp devaluation of
t h er u b l ec a nl e a dt oas i g n i ﬁcant change in the wealth of speculators on the real,w h i l eal a c ko f
devaluation cannot.
The model places other restrictions on the structure of equilibrium contagion as well. The
probability of a crisis in the market for reales, for example, is strictly increasing in the size of the
devaluation of the ruble. The model therefore predicts that contagion should be most frequently
observed following large devaluations. In addition, the model predicts that a currency crisis is
more likely to occur when domestic fundamentals are weak than when they are strong. These
restrictions derive from the fact that, at one level, the mechanism for contagion studied here is
fundamental; contagion results from ﬁnancial linkages between the two currency markets. In this
way, the present work is related to a number of papers that study howﬁnancial interdependence can
lead to the contagion of crises.
5 In the previous literature, however, the ﬁnancial linkages arise for
fundamental reasons. In Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), for example, investors choose to invest in
multiple markets for diversiﬁcation purposes, and this decision creates the links between markets
that lead to contagion. The point of the present paper is that these links can also arise solely as a
result of agents’ expectation that contagion will occur. Empirical evidence of the importance of
ﬁnancial links as a source of contagion should therefore be interpreted with caution. In particular,
such results do not demonstrate that expectations are unimportant or that contagion is an inevitable
outcome. Rather, the observed links could be a manifestation of self-fulﬁlling beliefs in contagion.
Theremainder of the paper is organizedas follows. The next section presents amodiﬁed version
of the model of Morris and Shin (1998) in which trading on a second currency market is possible.
Section 3 analyzes equilibrium in this model under various assumptions about the accessibility
of the second market to speculators and provides conditions under which equilibrium contagion
arises. Section 4 contains a discussion of the results, inc l u d i n ga na n a l y s i so f the relationship
between the model presented here and the classic sunspots model of Cass and Shell (1983).
2 The model
The model is presented in two steps. First I describe the model of the market for the domestic
currency in isolation. This model is nearly identical to that in Morris and Shin (1998), and hence
5 See Allen and Gale (2000), Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), and Kodres and Pritsker (2002).
5the descriptiongivenhere is brief. I then addthe possibilityof speculationinthe market for another
currency, so that contagion across markets can be studied.
2.1 T h ed o m e s t i cc u r r e n c ym a r k e t
The domestic government has pegged the exchange rate at e∗ dollars per unit of local currency.
The economy is characterized by a fundamental “strength” θ ∈ [0,1], which determines what the
exchange rate would be in the absence of government intervention in the currency market. The
variable θ captures the demand for the domestic currency for international trade, foreign direct
investment, and other purposes. The exchange rate if the government takes no action will be given
by f (θ), where f is continuous and strictly increasing. It is assumed that e∗ = f (1) holds. In
other words, at the pegged value of the exchange rate, the domestic currency is overvalued in
almost all possible states of the economy. The government must decide whether to take the actions
necessary to maintain the peg, or to abandon the peg and let the exchange rate fall to the market
value f (θ).
T h e r ei sa[0,1] continuum of identical speculators, each of whom has the ability to “attack”
the domestic currency by selling it short. Short sales are limited by the speculator’s wealth, which
is denominated in dollars. In particular, each unit of wealth allows a speculator to short-sell one
unit of the domestic currency.
6 Each speculator has w units of wealth available. Morris and Shin
(1998) set w =1a n dp r o v i d e da ni n f o r m a ld i s c u s s i o no ft h ecomparative static results with respect
to the level of wealth. Wealth enters the model here in a way that corresponds to their discussions.
Speculators are risk neutral, and therefore their choice set is essentially binary: either a speculator
will attack with all of her wealth or she will not attack at all. There is a cost t that a speculator
must pay for each unit of the currency she sells short; one can think of this cost as the interest
rate differential between the domestic currency and dollars. If a speculator chooses to attack the
currency, her net gain will be w(e∗ − f (θ) − t) if the government abandons the peg and (−wt) if
the peg is maintained.
The government receives a value v>0 if the peg is maintained. It will choose to maintain the
peg if and only if this beneﬁt is greater than the cost of doing so. The cost of maintaining the peg
depends on on two things: the state of the economy and the size of the attack against the currency.
This cost is represented by the function c(z,θ), where z is the size of the attack (i.e., the number
6 This one-for-one property is just a choice of units.
6of units of domestic currency sold short). The function c is continuous, strictly increasing in z,and
strictly decreasing in θ. Furthermore, the two conditions
c(0,0) >v and c(1,1) >v
are assumed to hold. The ﬁrst says that in the worst state of fundamentals, the peg will be aban-
doned even if there is no attack against the currency. The second says that even in the best state
of fundamentals, the peg will be abandoned if the size of the attack is equal to the initial wealth of
all speculators. See Morris and Shin (1998) for a discussion of the role of these conditions in the
analysis.
The timing of events is as follows. Each speculator begins with a belief about θ that is repre-
sented by a uniform distribution on [0,1].N a t u r et h e nd r a w st h et r u ev a l u eo fθ from this distri-
bution. Speculators do not observe the true state. Rather, speculator i observes a signal xi which
is drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval [θ − ε,θ + ε],w h e r eε is a small but pos-
itive number. A law of large numbers is assumed, so that the distribution of signals received by
t h ed i f f e r e n ts p e c u l a t o r si sa l s ou n i f o r mo n[θ − ε,θ + ε]. Based on her signal, each speculator
decides whether or not to attack the currency. Next, the government observes the true value of θ
and the size of the attack z = wα, where α is the fraction of speculators who chose to attack. The
government then decides whether abandon or maintain the peg, and payoffs are realized.
The model presented so far is identical to that in Morris and Shin (1998) except that the wealth
level of each speculator is treated parametrically rather than being ﬁxed at unity. As such, for w
close enough to unity the results derived by Morris and Shin continue to hold. In particular, the
game described above has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium for any ε>0. In this equilibrium,
there exists a cutoff value θ
∗ such that the peg is abandoned if θ ≤ θ
∗ and is maintained if θ>θ
∗.
In the limit as ε goes to zero, the cutoff value can be characterized in the following way. Deﬁne
a(θ,w) to be the smallest fraction of speculators (each with wealth w) whose attack would lead
the government to abandon the peg when θ is the true state of the economy. That is, the function
a(θ,w) is implicitly deﬁned by
c(w · a(θ,w),θ) ≡ v.
It is straightforward to show that a is increasing in θ and decreasing in w.D e ﬁne g(α,θ,w) to be
7the net beneﬁt of attacking when a fraction α of the other agents attack. Then we have
g(α,θ,w)=
½















In other words, an agent whose belief about the actions of other agents can be represented by a
uniform distribution for α on [0,1] must be indifferent between attacking and not attacking at θ
∗.
This condition can be viewed as a deﬁnition of risk dominance for symmetric binary-action games
games with a continuum of players.
7 The results of Morris and Shin can therefore be interpreted
as saying that, in the limit as the noise on the individual signals goes to zero, the global games
approach “selects” the risk-dominant equilibrium of the common-knowledge game.
Using expression (1), the equation above can be rewritten as
[1 − a(θ,w)]w(e
∗ − f (θ) − t)+a(θ,w)(−wt)=0 ,




∗ − f (θ
∗)) = t. (2)
This expression implicitly deﬁnes a function θ
∗ (w) with the following property: in the unique
equilibrium of this model, a devaluation will occur if θ ≤ θ
∗ (w) holds and will not occur if
θ>θ
∗ (w) holds. In the analysis that follows, the properties of this function play a critical role.
The proposition below, which was ﬁrst shown by Heinemann (2000), states that when speculators
have more wealth, the set of states in which a devaluation occurs becomes strictly larger.
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Proposition 1 The equilibrium cutoff value θ
∗ is strictly increasing in the wealth level of specu-
lators w.
A simple proof of this result can be obtained by implicitly differentiating (2).
7 See Harsanyi and Selten (1988) for a detailed discussion of risk dominance in ﬁnite-player games.
8 In their informal discussion, Morris and Shin (1998) said that the cutoff θ
∗ is increasing in the wealth of speculators
when ε is large, but that this effect disappears as ε goes to zero. Heinemann (2000) corrected their calculations
and showed that the effect remains present in the limit.
8Continuing to focus on the limiting case as ε goes to zero, consider the expected utility level
of a speculator who enters this market with wealth wi (which in principle could be different from
the wealth level w of other speculators). If the realization of θ is less than θ
∗ (w), ad e v a l u a t i o n
occurs and the speculator will gain the amount (e∗ − f (θ) − t) f o re a c hu n i to fw e a l t ht h a ts h eh a s
available. Her ﬁnal wealth level, and hence her consumption, will then be
wi (1 + e
∗ − f (θ) − t).
If the realization of θ is higher than θ
∗ (w), the speculator takes no action and simply consumes
her wealth.





∗ − f (θ) − t)dθ ≡ µ(w). (3)
It is important to keep in mind that this marginal utility is independent of her own wealth level wi
because she is risk neutral. However, it does depend on the wealth level w of the other speculators
in the market because w determines the set of states in which a devaluation occurs. In fact, using
Proposition 1, it is easy to see that the function µ deﬁned in (3) is strictly increasing in w. The
more wealth the other speculators have, the higher is the marginal value of wealth for an individual
speculator. In other words, in addition to the usual complementarity in actions (i.e., attacking
is more attractive when other agents attack), this model also exhibits complementarity in wealth
levels. This property is crucial to the analysis that follows and is worth repeating: in the Morris-
Shin model, the marginal utility of wealth of an individual speculator is strictly increasing in the
wealth level of other speculators.
2.2 Speculation on another currency
I now introduce the possibility for agents in the model to speculate in another market, where a
foreigncurrencyis traded(alsoagainst the dollar). This market meets before the domestic currency
market, and before speculators receive their signals about the strength of the domestic economy.
The basic structure of this market is that same as that described above. The foreign government
has pegged its exchange rate at e∗
F dollars per unit of foreign currency and must decide whether to
maintain this peg or abandon it. The fundamental state of the foreign economy is denoted θF ∈
9 When ε is arbitrarily small, the speculator’s signal about θ is very accurate and hence she is able to attack in
precisely the set of states in which a devaluation occurs.
9[0,1], and speculators’ initial belief about this variable is represented by a uniform distribution on
[0,1]. As above, the variable θF includes the effects of all inﬂuences on the value of the foreign
currency other than the actions of the agents in this model. If the peg is abandoned, the value of
the foreign currency will be given by f (θF),w h e r ef is again continuous and strictly increasing
with e∗
F = f (1). The government receives a value vF from maintaining the peg, and will do
so if this value is greater than the cost cF (θF,z F), where zF is the size of the speculative attack
against the foreign currency. The variables θ and θF are uncorrelated; in other words, the economic
fundamentals in the two countries are assumed to be completely unrelated.
The foreign currency market differs from the domestic market in one key respect: speculators
may or may not receive a signal about the state of fundamentals θF. The idea here is that a specula-
tor in this model, as in Morris and Shin (1998), naturally operates in the domestic currency market
and hence necessarily has good information about the fundamentals in that market. The funda-
mentals in the foreign currency market, however, are completely unrelated and may not naturally
be part of her information set. Both cases are studied below, where I argue that the case where
speculators are not well informed about θF is the more interesting one.
As in the domestic market, each speculator can choose to attack the foreign currency by selling
it short, and short sales are restricted by a speculator’s wealth. At the beginning of time, each
speculator has one unit of wealth. Because she is risk neutral, she will either attack the foreign
currency with all of this wealth or not at all. There is a cost tF for each unit of foreign currency
sold short, so that the net gain of attacking per unit of wealth is (e∗
F − f (θF) − tF) if the peg is
abandoned and (−tF) if it is maintained.
The question of interest in this paper is under what conditions the outcome in the foreign cur-
rency market has an impact on the domestic market. I will say that contagion occurs if the oc-
currence and/or size of a devaluation of the foreign currency affects the equilibrium probability
distribution over outcomes in the domestic market; this statement is equivalent to the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition: Contagion is said to occur if the equilibrium cutoff value θ
∗ in the domestic market
depends on the realization of the foreign fundamentals θF.
103 Equilibrium
This section presents the analysis of equilibrium contagion in the model for three different
cases, depending on the access speculators have to the foreign currency market. In the ﬁrst case, it
is simply assumed that speculators cannot trade on the foreign market; this case serves as a useful
benchmark. In the second case, speculators can place trades in the foreign market and receive
signals about foreign economic fundamentals exactly as in the domestic market. In the ﬁnal (and
most interesting) case, speculators are free to trade in the foreign market but do not receive signals
about foreign economic fundamentals. In each case, the question of interest is whether or not
contagion can occur in equilibrium and, if it can, what form it takes.
3.1 Foreign speculation not allowed
First suppose that speculators are not allowed to trade in the foreign currency market. Solving
for the equilibrium of the model is then straightforward. Each speculator will enter the domestic
currency market with her original wealth level of one, and hence the game played in this market
will be exactly that of Morris and Shin (1998). Ther ei sau n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u mi nt h i sm a r k e t ,a n df o r
the limiting case as ε goes to zero the cutoff level θ
∗ (1) is implicitly deﬁn e di n( 2 ) .I np a r t i c u l a r ,
this cutoff level is necessarily independent of events in the foreign currency market. There is no
contagion: regardless of the realization of foreign fundamentals θF, the unique equilibrium in the
domestic currency market is characterized by the same cutoff level. This simple result will be a
useful benchmark in what follows.
Proposition 2 If speculators cannot trade in the foreign cu r r e n c ym a r k e t ,t h e r ei sau n i q u ee q u i -
librium and no contagion occurs.
This proposition shows that the simple type of expectations-driven contagion discussed in the
Introduction cannot occur in this model. If there are no links between the two currency markets,
the unique equilibrium in the domestic market must be played regardless of what happens in the
foreign market. The outcome in the foreign market is also easy to determine, since the only active
agentistheforeigngovernment. Adevaluationoccursinthismarketifandonlyifthefundamentals
are so bad that the cost of defending the peg when no one attacks is larger than the value of doing
11so, that is, if
cF (θF,0) ≤ vF
holds. Let θF be the state at which the above expression holds with equality, so that a devaluation
of the foreign currency occurs whenever θF ≤ θF holds.
3.2 Informed speculation
For the sake of comparison, consider now the other extreme case, where speculators can freely
t r a d ei nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e ta n da r ea si n f o r m e da bout foreign economic fundamentals as they are
about domestic fundamentals. Notice that attacking the foreign currency is not a risky undertaking
in this environment. In equilibrium, a speculator knows θF arbitrarily well and will therefore be
able to attack in only those states where a devaluation will occur. The following proposition shows
that, in this case, contagion must occur.
Proposition 3 When speculators are informed about θF, contagion must occur in equilibrium.
Proof: An equilibrium without contagion would require, by Proposition 1, that speculators enter
the domestic currency market with the same level of wealth for every realization of θF. However,
when speculators are informed about the state of foreign fundamentals, it is a dominant strategy to
attack the foreign currency when θF ≤ θF holds. A devaluation will always occur in these states,
so any equilibrium must have
w =1+e
∗
F − f (θF) − tF > 1
for θF ≤ θF. Similarly, not attacking is a dominant strategy for values of θF close enough to one,
because in such cases the gain from a devaluation if it occurs would be less than the cost tF of
attacking. Thus any equilibrium must have w =1for realizations of θF close enough to one.
Contagion therefore occurs. ¥
This result simply reﬂects the fact that when speculators are well informed about foreign eco-
nomic fundamentals, they will necessarily be active in the foreign c u r r e n c ym a r k e ti ns o m es t a t e s
of the world. In a sense, this type of contagion is not surprising. The two currency markets are
fundamentally linked, because the same set of speculators naturally operates in both of them. In
12such a case, contagion of crises across markets must occur. This result is therefore similar in spirit
to those of Allen and Gale (2000) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2004). The more interesting ques-
tion in the current setting is what forces might drive contagion across markets that are, at least
in principle, unrelated. Addressing this question requires changing the model so that speculators
are not naturally active in the foreign market. In the next subsection, this is done by assuming
that speculators are less well informed about foreign economic fundamentals than about domestic
fundamentals.
3.3 Uninformed speculation
Now suppose that speculators are allowed to trade in the foreign currency market, but that they do
not receive any signals about the foreign economic fundamentals. Instead, the decision of whether
or not to attack the foreign currency must be made based on the prior belief about θF. In this case,
a t t a c k i n gt h ef o r e i g nc u r r e n c yi sn ol o n g e rar i skless undertaking. A speculator who chooses to
attack will gain in some states of the world and lose in others. In addition, suppose the parameter





F − f (θF))dθF <t F (4)
holds. This condition says that the expected value of attacking the foreign currency when no one
else attacks (and one’s belief about θF is uniform on [0,1]) is negative. Everything on the left-
hand side of this inequality (including θF) is independent of tF, and hence this condition simply
requires that tF not be too small. If this inequality were reversed, risk neutral speculators would
always want to gamble in the foreign currency market. In such a case, links between the two
markets would arise simply because both offer attractive trading opportunities to the same set of
speculators, and contagion between these market sw o u l dn e c e s s a r i l ya r i s ea si nP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Instead, condition (4) requires that, ap r i o r i , the foreign currency market represent an unattractive
gamble to the speculators in the model.
Under this condition, the equilibrium discussed in Section 3.1 is also an equilibrium in the
current setting. To see this, consider the problem of an individual speculator who believes that
no other speculators will attack the foreign currency. If she were to attack, her expected wealth






F − f (θF))dθF − tF < 1.
Her marginal utility of wealth in the domestic market will equal µ(1), as deﬁned in (3), regardless
of the realization of θF. She would therefore choose not to attack. Hence there is an equilibrium
where none of the speculators attack the foreign currency, and all enter the domestic currency
market with a wealth level of one. The equilibrium cutoff in the domestic market given by θ
∗ (1),
independent of the realization of θF, and no contagion occurs. This discussion is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When speculators are uninformed about θF and (4) holds, there is an equilibrium
where no speculator attacks the foreign currency and no contagion occurs.






F − f (θF))dθF,
so that condition (4) can be rewritten as tF >t F. The next proposition shows that, for values of tF
close enough to tF, there also exists an equilibrium in which contagion occurs.




, there is an equilibrium
where all speculators attack the foreign currency and contagion occurs.
Proof: Supposeallspeculatorsbutoneareattackingtheforeigncurrency, andconsiderthedecision
problem of the remaining speculator. The total size of the attack against the foreign currency in
this case will be zF =1 , so the foreign government will defend the peg if and only if
cF (θF,1) <v F
holds. Let b θF denote the unique value of θF for which the above relationship holds with equality,
so that a devaluation will occur for θF ≤ b θF but not for θF > b θF. Deﬁne w(θF) to be the wealth
level of each speculator who attacks the foreign currency, measured after payoffs in the foreign
14market are realized. Then we have
w(θF)=
(
1+e∗ − f (θF) − tF
1 − tF
if θF ≤ b θF
θF > b θF
)
(5)
If the speculator whose problem we are considering attacks the foreign currency, her wealth going
into the domestic currency market will also be equal to w(θF). If she does not attack, her wealth
level will be equal to one. Recalling that the marginal utility of wealth in the domestic market is































= vF and cF (θF,0) = vF,
we clearly have b θF >θ F. Furthermore, we know from (5) that w(θF) > 1 holds for θF ≤ b θF and
w(θF) < 1 holds for θF > b θF . Together, these relationships imply that the value of (6) evaluated
at tF = tF is strictly positive. By continuity, it is therefore positive on an open interval of values




, there is an equilibrium in
which all speculators attack the foreign currency.
All that remains to be shown is that contagion occurs in this equilibrium. This fact follows
directly from (5) and Proposition 1. When all speculators are attacking the foreign currency, the
wealth levels they carry into the domestic market depend in a non-trivial way on the realization of
15θF. Since the equilibrium cutoff value θ
∗ is strictly increasing in this wealth level, contagion must
occur. ¥
The fact that other speculators are attacking the foreign currency makes attacking more attrac-
tive to an individual in two ways. First, the attack makes a devaluation of the foreign currency
more likely, as reﬂected in the above calculations by the relationship b θF >θ F. This effect rep-
resents the complementarity in actions that is standard in coordination games. The second, and
more interesting, effect is that the attack by others will induce a correlation between the returns
in the two markets, and this correlation will make attacking more attractive to an individual. We
can isolate this second effect, which derives from the complementarity in wealth levels described






F − f (θF))dθF. (7)
When tF > b tF holds, the expected return to attacking the foreign currency is negative even when















dθF ≡ 0 (8)
and compare this equation to the expected utility ga i nf r o ma t t a c k i n gt h ef o r e i g nc u r r e n c yi n( 6 ) .
We know that w(θF) > 1 h o l d sw h e nad e v a l u a t i o no c c u r si nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e t( i . e . ,f o rθF ≤ b θF)
and w(θF) < 1 holds when it does not. Since µ(w) is a strictly increasing function, the expression
in (6) puts more weight on the positive term and less weight on the negative term, relative to (8),
and hence must be strictly positive when evaluated at b tF. By continuity, therefore, the expected
utility gain from attacking the foreign currency will be positive for an open interval of values of
tF above b tF, even though the expected return from attacking in these cases is negative. This result
clearly highlights the implications of the complementarity in wealth levels that naturally arises
in the Morris-Shin model. An individual speculator’s marginal utility of wealth is high in states
where the wealth levels of other speculators areh i g h .T h e r e f o r es h ew o u l dl i k et om a k et h es a m e
risky trade(s) that the others are making, even if the trade would not be attractive on its own merits.
This discussion is summarized in the following corollary.
16Corollary 1 Contagion can occur even when, in equilibrium, the expected return to attacking the
foreign currency is negative.
This equilibrium with contagion has other appealing properties as well. For example, a larger
devaluation of the foreign currency increases the probability of a domestic currency crisis. This
result follows immediately from Proposition 1 and expression (5).
Corollary 2 In the contagion equilibrium, the probability of a domestic currency crisis is strictly
increasing in the size of the devaluation of the foreign currency.
Also notice that the occurrence of a domestic currency crisis will be negatively correlated with
domestic economic fundamentals. When θ is higher, a larger devaluation of the foreign currency is
required in order to provoke a domestic devaluation. Hence crises will occur less frequently when
domestic fundamentals are strong and more frequently when fundam e n t a l sa r ew e a k .T h i sr e s u l t
and Corollary 2 both emphasize how the model presented here differs from the simple multiple-
equilibrium view of contagion. In the simple view, the outcome in the foreign market serves
only as a signal to coordinate the beliefs and actions of speculators in the domestic market. This
view offers no real explanation of which signals should lead speculators to attack the domestic
currency or how likely these signals should be. In addition, it implies that, for all values of θ in
multipleequilibriumregion, thelikelihood of adomesticcurrencycrisisisindependentof domestic
fundamentals; adomestic crisis occurs if and only if the appropriate signalis received.
10 The model
here, in contrast, yields clear predictions that are consistent with the correlations observed in the
d a t a :am o r es e v e r ec u r r e n c yc r i s i si sm o r el i k e l yt op r o v ec o n t a g i o u s ,a n dac r i s i si sm o r el i k e l y
to occur when domestic economic fundamentals are weak.
4D i s c u s s i o n
4.1 Multiplicity of equilibrium
Much of the interest in global-games analysis in macroeconomics comes from the fact that the
models often have a unique equilibrium, which places comparative-statics analysis on solid footing
10 This fact is commonly used to criticize multiple-equilibrium models. See, however, Ennis (2003) and Ennis and
Keister (2005a,b).
17and is potentially useful for conducting policy analysis. The results in Section 3.3 show how
introducing a second market can lead to multiplicity of equilibrium, but they do not undermine the
value of the global games approach. Quite to the contrary, the model presented here shows how
using the global-games approach places a great deal of structure on equilibrium contagion.
Consider the “traditional” version of the model, where the state of the domestic economy is
common knowledge. In this case, the domestic currency market (in isolation) has multiple equilib-
ria for an interval of values for θ. Once a second currency market is introduced, the outcome of this
market can act as a signal that coordinates the actions of speculators in the domestic market, even
they do not (or cannot) trade in this other currency. In particular, for each value of θ in the above-
mentioned interval, there can be a domestic crisis if the foreign currency devalues and not if it does
not, or the reverse, or a crisis in both cases, or a crisis in neither case. Hence there is a large number
of equilibria, including almost any possible correlation between outcomes in the two markets. The
results presented above show how, in contrast, the global-games-based model determines the form
that contagion must take if it occurs. The outcome of another currency market cannot act as a pure
coordination device in this model. Contagion can only occur when speculators’ beliefs lead them
to be active in both markets. The nature of the markets then determines the form that equilibrium
contagion must take: a sharp devaluation of the foreign currency increases the probability of a
domestic currency crisis. In other words, the global-games approch ties equilibrium expectations
to the economic environment in interesting and testable ways. The model predicts that existing
ﬁnancial links between markets are necessary for contagion to occur, and this prediction is broadly
consistent with the results in the empirical literature.
Moreover, the model shows that empirical evidence on the sources of contagion should be
interpreted with care. The fact that ﬁnancial links predict the spread of crises does not imply that
contagion is driven by underlying economic fundamentals nor that it is an inevitable outcome.
Rather, these links could arise solely as a result of the expectation that contagion will occur and
are therefore consistent with the existence of an equilibrium where ﬁnancial links do not arise and
no contagion occurs. Further research is needed to determine how important a role expectations
have played in driving the observed spread of currency crises across countries.
184.2 A sunspots interpretation
The results in this paper can be interpreted in a way that closely mirrors the classic paper of Cass
and Shell (1983). Cass and Shell studied a standard Walrasian economy augmented to include
“sunspots,” a random variable that is completely extrinsic in the sense that it has no effect on eco-
nomic fundamentals. They showed that when the underlying economy (without sunspots) has a
unique equilibrium and agents cannot trade sunspot-contingent assets, sunspots cannot affect equi-
librium allocations. This follows from the fact that in every sunspot state, the economy is exactly
the same and hence the unique equilibrium must obtain. They then showed two ways in which
sunspots can matter, one fairly obvious and the other much less so. First, suppose that the under-
lying economy has multiple equilibria. Then different equilibria might obtain in different sunspot
states; that is, the realization of the sunspot variable might act as a signal that coordinates agents on
a particular equilibrium. The sunspot equilibrium constructed this way is a randomization over the
equilibria of the underlying economy. The second, and more interesting, case is when agents can
trade assets whose payoffs depend on the realization of the sunspot variable. In this case, Cass and
Shell showed that even when the underlying economy has a unique equilibrium, there can (under
some conditions) be equilibria where sunspots affect allocations. If agents believe that the relative
prices of commodities will depend on the sunspot state, they may want to use the asset market
to transfer wealth across states. In some cases, this reallocation of wealth can cause the original
expectations about prices to be fulﬁlled.
In the model presented in this paper, one can interpret the devaluation state of the foreign cur-
rency as a “sunspot-like” variable. Whether or not this currency devalues has no effect on the
preferences of agents in the model nor on the fundamental state θ of the domestic economy. If
speculators cannot trade in the foreign currency market, contagion can occur in equilibrium if and
only if the domestic currency market (in isolation) has multiple equilibria. This is the “traditional”
view of expectations-based contagion and is analogous to the ﬁrst type of sunspot equilibrium de-
scribed above, where the sunspot variable serves only as a signal that selects an equilibrium of the
underlying economy. Discussion (and criticism) of expectations-based theories of contagion has
focused on this particular form of contagion. The global-games approach, however, generates a
unique equilibrium in the domestic currency market, and hence rules out this type of sunspot-like
19equilibrium.
11 The model of contagion presented in this paper instead resembles the second, richer
type of sunspot equilibrium. There is a unique equilibrium if trade on the foreign (or “sunspot”)
market is not allowed. Once such trade is introduced, however, beliefs that the equilibrium vari-
ables will differ across “sunspot” states can be self-fulﬁlling because agents will use this market to
transfer wealth across states. Hence contagion driven solely by expectations can occur even when
the currency market has a unique equilibrium, in precisely the same way that sunspot equilibria
can exist even when the underlying Walrasian economy has a unique equilibrium.
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4.3 Concluding remarks
The analysis presented here has shown how contagion of currency crises can be driven solely
by expectations, even in an environment where equilibrium is unique in each individual currency
market. When speculators expect the occurrence of a crisis in the domestic market to be correlated
with the outcome of some other market, they have an incentive to engage in trades that link the two
markets together. These links can then propagate a crisis across the markets in a way that fulﬁlls
the original expectations. If speculators did not expect contagion to occur, these links may not be
formed and contagion need not occur.
Many features of the model studied here are fairly special, but these do not seem essential for
the results. For example, the assumption that speculators are risk neutral simpliﬁes the analysis by
generating boundary solutions to the spectators’ portfolio-choice problem. Introducing risk aver-
sion would complicate matters technically, but the effects highlighted here would clearly remain.
Speculators would still have a higher marginal value of wealth in states where a devaluation of the
domestic currency is more likely. If a speculator expects contagion to occur, therefore, she would
still desire to transfer wealth into these states by short-selling the foreign currency. Other minor
modiﬁcations of the model also seem unlikely to affect the main results.
The model (following Morris and Shin, 1998) does take a particular view of the nature of cur-
rency crises: they are caused by speculative attacks. Real world currency crises are complex
phenomena and many of their features are obviously not captured by this model. For example,
11 See Heinemann and Illing (2002) on this point.
12 Theanalogyisnotexact, ofcourse. CassandShell(1983)requirethatsomeagentsberestrictedfromtradingbefore
the sunspot state is realized; otherwise the ﬁrst welfare theorem would guarantee that sunspots do not matter. In the
present model, all agents can be granted access to the foreign market. In addition, Cass and Shell need heterogeneous
agents for sunspot-contingent trade to occur in equilibrium. Here the homogeneous speculators are implicitly trading
with the foreign central bank in the “sunspot” market.
20during times of crisis investors who hold real assets in a country tend to pull out, selling these
local-currency denominated assets. Such movements put pressure on the local currency in much
the same way that attacks by speculators do. Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) have shown, within a
global-games framework, how a crisis caused by bad fundamentals in one country can be propa-
gated to another country by investors who hold positions in both. While this mechanism of conta-
gion is similar to the one studied here (contagion occurs due to ﬁnancial links between markets) the
underlying source of contagion in their model is fundamental; investors choose to take positions
in multiple countries for diversiﬁcation purposes. It would be interesting to investigate what role
e x p e c t a t i o n sc a np l a yi nd r i v i n gc o n t a g i o nw h e n one takes their view (or others; see Guimaraes
and Morris, 2004) of the basic nature of a currency crisis.
REFERENCES
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (2000) Financial Contagion, Journal of Political Economy 108,
pp. 1-33.
Cass, David and Karl Shell (1983) Do Sunspots Matter? Journal of Political Economy 91, pp.
193-227.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, Yung Chul Park, and Stijn Claessens (2000) Contagion: Understanding How
It Spreads, World Bank Research Observer 15, pp. 177–197.
Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz (1996) Contagious Currency Crises,
NBER Working Paper 5681, July.
Ennis, Huberto M. (2003) Economic Fundamentals and Bank Runs, Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond Economic Quarterly 89, 55-71.
Ennis, Huberto M. and Todd Keister (2005a) Government Policy and the Probability of Coordina-
tion Failures, European Economic Review 49, 939-973.
Ennis, Huberto M. and Todd Keister (2005b) OptimalFiscal Policy with Multiple Equilibria, forth-
coming in the Journal of Monetary Economics.
Gerlach, Stefan and Frank Smets (1995) Contagious Speculative Attacks, European Journal of
Political Economy 11, pp. 45-63.
Glick, Reuven and Andrew K. Rose (1999) Contagion and Trade: Why are Currency Crises Re-
gional? Journal of International Money and Finance 18, 603-617.
Goldstein, Itay and Ady Pauzner (2004) Contagion of Self-Fulﬁlling Financial Crises Due to Di-
versiﬁcation of Investment Portfolios, Journal of Economic Theory 119, pp. 51-183.
21Guimaraes, Bernardo and Stephen Morris (2004 )R i s ka n dW e a l t hi naM o d e lo fS e l f - F u l ﬁlling
Currency Attacks, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1433R, November.
Harsanyi, J. and R. Selten (1988) A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games,M I TP r e s s ,
Cambridge, MA.
Heinemann, Frank (2000) Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulﬁlling Currency Attacks:
Comment. American Economic Review 90, 316-318.
Heinemann, Frank and Gerhard Illing (2002) Speculative Attacks: Unique Equilibrium and Trans-
parency, Journal of International Economics 58, 429-450.
Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Carmen M. Reinhart (2000) On Crises, Contagion, and Confusion,
Journal of International Economics 51, 145-168.
Kodres, Laura E. and Matthew Pritsker (2002) A Rational Expectations Model of Financial Con-
tagion, Journal of Finance 57, 769-799.
Krugman, Paul (1999) Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises, International
Tax and Public Finance 6, pp. 459-472.
Masson, Paul (1999) Contagion: macroeconomic models with multiple equilibria, Journal of In-
ternational Money and Finance 18, 587-602.
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin (1998), Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulﬁlling
Currency Attacks, American Economic Review 88, 587-597.
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin (2003), Global Games: Theory and Applications, in Ad-
vances in Economics and Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the
Econometric Society), edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press.
Obstfeld, Maurice (1996) Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulﬁlling Features, European Eco-
nomic Review 40, 1037-1047.
Pritsker, Matthew (2000) The Channels for Financial Contagion, mimeo., Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.
Van Rijckeghem, Caroline and Beatrice Weder (2001) Sources of Contagion: Is it Finance or
Trade? Journal of International Economics 54, 293-308.
22